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The history of  the American South has always been part of  a broad-
er, international story, at least from the time the first transatlantic 
immigrants arrived in ships from England, Spain, or Africa, and the 
first crops of  tobacco, rice, cotton, and sugar went out from southern 
ports to the world beyond.
Among those who have interpreted the history of  the American 
South are many of  the pioneers in comparative, international history: 
Stanley Elkins, Herbert Klein, George Fredrickson, Carl Degler, and 
Peter Kolchin, to name but a few, all demonstrate a long-standing and 
notable interest in placing the American South within a larger frame-
work. The focus of  most of  these studies has been heavily on com-
parative studies of  slavery and race, which has enlarged our under-
standing of  those subjects immeasurably. Not enough attention has 
been given to the many other levels of  exchange in the Atlantic 
world.
In this essay I want to take a different approach to international-
izing southern history, focusing on that moment in the 1860s when the 
American South tried to claim a place in the world of  nations. The 
story of  the American Civil War has been told largely in terms of  the 
military and political conflict between combatants in the North and 
South. We generally leave diplomacy and foreign relations as a side 
story and one mostly focused on formal relations between the Union 
and Britain or France. Let us consider international relations in a 
broader sense, one that incorporates public opinion and ideology, and 
look at the wider world of  Europe and Latin America in the Age of  
Nationalism.1
Nationalism, one Brazilian scholar put it, is “the story we tell our-
selves about ourselves.”2 Our knowledge of  this “domestic national-
ism” in the South has been greatly enhanced by a number of  excellent 
studies, particularly Drew Faust’s cogent examination of  The Creation 
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of  Confederate Nationalism.3 What I want to turn to today is another 
dimension of  southern nationalism, the story nations tell the world 
about themselves, who they are, and why they deserve to be nations.
The Confederate appeal to the world for its place in the “family of  
nations” has remained surprisingly neglected. The last comprehensive 
study of  Confederate diplomacy was Frank Owsley’s King Cotton 
 Diplomacy, published in 1931. This is a thorough study of  the Confed-
eracy’s disappointed hope that Britain and France’s economic interest 
in southern cotton was the key to foreign recognition and independ-
ence. Owsley acknowledged that world opinion was against slavery but 
refused to admit it was the major obstacle to Confederate diplomatic 
success, at least in Britain.4 Charles Hubbard’s The Burden of  Confed-
erate Diplomacy (1998) constitutes a valuable update, not least because 
Hubbard makes a convincing case for how close the Confederacy came 
to gaining recognition, and with it financial aid, military intervention, 
and national independence. As I read Hubbard’s account, but for its 
“poorly chosen diplomats” (oafish tobacco-chewing emissaries who 
made impolitic remarks in crude Creole French) the Confederacy might 
well have secured the international support they needed to sustain 
independence, especially during the first two years of  the war when 
the verdict of  the battlefield was unclear, when the Union’s aim was 
only to maintain national authority, and when international opinion 
favored the claims of  nations aspiring to independence. Both Owsley’s 
and Hubbard’s Confederate diplomats recognize the world’s hostility 
to slavery, but they resent it and counterattack by exposing the North’s 
and Europe’s hypocrisy on the issue. They score debating points, but 
not many diplomatic victories.5 Both Owsley and Hubbard stick close-
ly to the formal diplomatic dealings, and they keep their focus on 
Britain and France.
Missing from the picture of  American foreign relations during the 
Civil War is arguably the most important ideological force shaping the 
modern world: nationalism. The simple notion that a distinctive peo-
ple with a common territory have the right to govern themselves 
transformed the Western world beginning in 1776. From the U.S. to 
France, through Europe to Greece, Italy, Ireland, Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, and through Latin America from Mexico to Argentina, the 
“national idea” redrew the map of  the Atlantic world.
Today we tend to think of  nationalism as a chauvinistic, aggressive 
ideology, the intellectual property of  reactionary regimes promoting 
imperialist conquest and ethnic cleansing. Current scholars of  nation-
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alism typically see it as a false, pernicious ideology of  ‘imagined com-
munities’ and ‘invented traditions’ constructed by elites to manipulate 
the masses to no good ends. Our view of  nationalism has been dark-
ened by the deep shadow of  fascism, but this ought not to obscure the 
liberal, humanitarian origins of  the ‘national idea,’ which began as a 
revolutionary ideology firmly aligned with ideals of  self-rule, equality, 
and reform of  all kinds.
Foremost among such reforms was antislavery, a close ally to na-
tionalism throughout the Atlantic world. With the notable exception 
of  the American South and Brazil, the emancipation of  nations and 
slaves followed hand in hand. Nationalism and abolitionism used the 
same language of  universal freedom. Giuseppe Mazzini, the Italian 
nationalist, explained to one abolitionist: “We are fighting the same 
sacred battle for freedom and the emancipation of  the oppressed, – 
you, Sir, against negro, we against white slavery. The cause is truly 
identical.” “Do not forget whilst at work for the emancipation of  the 
black race, the millions of  white slaves, suffering, struggling, expiring 
in Italy, in Poland, in Hungary, throughout all Europe, . . . desecrated 
by arbitrary, tyrannical power, by czars, emperors, and popes.”6
At the beginning of  the Civil War, while the Union kept a safe dis-
tance from emancipation, the Confederacy made its case before the 
world of  nations by comparing its cause with that of  other emerging 
nations. The most obvious inspiration for Confederate nationalism was 
found in the American Revolution – the original model for liberal na-
tionalism. Drew Faust has shown how Confederates appropriated the 
language and symbols of  liberal civic nationalism by likening the 
spirit of  1861 to that of  1776. Confederates adopted George Washing-
ton as the father of  their country and placed his likeness on the 
 national seal. Several declarations of  secession borrowed language 
from the Declaration of  Independence.7 Confederate president Jef-
ferson Davis’ inaugural address drew heavily on the Declaration to 
make his case for the independence of  the South.8
To the international world Confederates placed themselves beside 
other aspiring nations in Europe and Latin America, pointing out to 
British and French diplomats that their policies toward Italy, Hun-
gary, Greece, and Poland were exactly what the Confederacy was ask-
ing of  them: recognition as an aspiring nation.9
Jefferson Davis understood far better than many of  his fellow 
Confederates the necessity of  this appeal to liberal nationalist princi-
ples of  self-determination, and he recognized the political difficulty of  
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trying to make the case to the world in the language of  white su-
premacy and proslavery ideology. He was furious with his vice presi-
dent, Alexander Stephens, when in March 1861 he issued what came 
to be known as the ‘cornerstone speech.’ Like Davis, Stephens aligned 
the Confederacy with the most hallowed principles of  American con-
stitutional democracy, but he went on to underscore the main differ-
ence between the new southern nation and its predecessor by taking 
after the Founding Fathers for their errant antislavery ways, for they 
believed 
that the enslavement of  the African was in violation of  the laws of  nature; that 
it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. . . . Those ideas, how-
ever, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of  the equal-
ity of  races. . . . Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; 
its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro 
is not equal to the white man; that slavery – subordination to the superior race 
– is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in 
the history of  the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and mor-
al truth.10
During wartime diplomacy, Union agents never missed an opportu-
nity to remind the world of  Stephens’ proposition that slavery was the 
cornerstone of  the Confederacy. It was this association with proslav-
ery and racism that put the Confederate cause in such bad odor with 
liberal public opinion across much of  Europe and Latin America, and 
it was this that doomed their cause as much as reverses on the field of  
battle.
Garibaldi’s Question
The contradictions between these two expressions of  national identity 
and purpose, one domestic, the other international, could coexist so 
long as the Union disclaimed slavery as the central issue of  the war. 
The Union, too, came to define its national purpose in the process of  
telling the world what the war was about and why it must not recog-
nize southern rebels as a nation.
This was illustrated in the summer of  1861 when Giuseppe Garibal-
di, the Italian nationalist, received a letter from J. W. Quiggle, U.S. 
Consul in Antwerp: “The papers report that you are going to the 
United States to join the Army of  the North in the conflict of  my 
country . . . ,” Quiggle wrote. “If  you do, the name of  La Fayette will 
not surpass yours. There are thousands of  Italians and Hungarians 
who will rush to join your ranks and there are thousands and tens of  
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thousands of  Americans who will glory to be under the command of  
‘the Washington of  Italy.’”11
Garibaldi wrote back to Quiggle: “I have had and still have a great 
desire to go.” He raised several conditions and then posed the question 
of  the hour: “Tell me also, whether this agitation is [about] the eman-
cipation of  the negroes or not.”12
Secretary of  State William Seward wanted nothing more than to 
enlist Garibaldi in the Union cause, not because he believed the aging 
general – or even the thousands of  his red shirted followers who 
 volunteered to come as well – would actually help in the outcome of  
the military contest as such. Seward understood that to have Garibal-
di on the Union side would carry tremendous influence in Europe, 
Latin America, and beyond. He sent Henry Shelton Sanford, U.S. 
Ambassador to Belgium and an acquaintance of  Garibaldi, to person-
ally invite the “Hero of  Two Worlds” to come fight for “the cause of  
Human Freedom” in America.13
Garibaldi wanted to come to America, his ‘second country’ as he 
fondly referred to it, but he issued two conditions that neither Seward 
nor anyone else in the Lincoln administration was prepared to honor, 
at least at this stage in the war. First, Garibaldi insisted on having 
total command of  all Union armed forces. Second, he asked for the 
power to declare the war against slavery. Without the former, Garibal-
di calmly explained to Sanford, he would be of  little use as a subordi-
nate officer. Without the latter, “it would appear like a civil war in 
which the world at large could have little interest or sympathy.”14 
Negotiations ended, and Sanford went back to Rome, but Garibaldi’s 
question loomed over the war during the next two years of  what 
seemed to remain, as Garibaldi characterized it, only a civil war. 
George Perkins Marsh, a Vermont abolitionist and the first U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom of  Italy, knew better. Conversant 
in some twenty languages, a veteran diplomat with experience in the 
Middle East and Europe, Marsh understood world opinion as well as 
any American of  his time. He wrote to Seward that summer: Europe-
ans see this conflict as “a contest between the propagandists of  do-
mestic slavery and the advocates of  emancipation and universal free-
dom.” If  the Union showed it condoned slavery or failed to show “at 
least, moral hostility to slavery,” he warned Seward, “I have no doubt 
that the dissolution of  the Union would be both desired and pro-
moted by a vast majority of  those who now hope for its perpetua-
tion.”15
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Pariah Nation
Meanwhile, Confederate agents overseas answered Garibaldi’s question 
forthrightly by pointing to Lincoln’s own assurances that slavery 
would be protected in the states where it existed. Their struggle for 
national independence had little to do with slavery, they argued; it was 
about tariffs and the imposition of  northern industrial power on the 
agrarian South. Confederate agents sought to educate diplomats and 
public opinion as to the ‘true’ causes of  the conflict, to distance their 
cause from slavery and racism, and seek recognition based on their 
national right to self-determination.
But Confederates had little success persuading the world that slav-
ery was not the issue, despite the Union’s neutrality on the question. 
By this time, the South was nearly alone in its adherence to slavery. 
The Empire of  Brazil was the only other independent nation in the 
Western world that still sanctioned slavery. Colonial remnants of  the 
Spanish Empire, Cuba and Puerto Rico, and some Dutch Caribbean 
colonies, also continued to permit slavery. The American South was 
alone among the republics of  the world in its support of  slavery.
Confederates were frustrated by the international hostility to slav-
ery. Believing notions of  white superiority over Negroes to be wide-
spread, Confederate diplomats were often irritated by what they con-
sidered hypocritical and sanctimonious opinions against slavery. Most 
of  all, they were frustrated by the tendency of  the slavery question 
to interfere with their case for national self-determination. 
Confederate commissioner Ambrose Dudley Mann found a more 
sympathetic audience at the Vatican. Pope Pius IX, the arch foe of  
liberal Europe since 1848 when he resisted Mazzini and Garibaldi’s 
efforts to erect a Republic of  Rome, agreed to issue a public letter of  
support to President Jefferson Davis. Confederates had swayed him 
with reports of  the persecution Irish and other Catholic immigrants 
had suffered at the hands of  Protestant bigotry in the North. Unlike 
other European rulers, the Pope had no liberal electorate to answer 
to. As Stalin later observed, the Pope had no battalions either, and it 
was not clear what diplomatic, military, or financial advantage might 
be gained by this act of  recognition. To be sure, Rome’s influence in 
Catholic Europe remained strong in the 1860s. France’s Napoleon III, 
an abiding ally of  the Pope since 1848, was all that stood between the 
Vatican and Garibaldi’s red shirts. The Pope’s letter was widely pub-
lished, and Confederates eagerly interpreted the Pope’s use of  the 
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word ‘president’ as tantamount to formal recognition. Perhaps France 
and conservative Catholics in Europe and Latin America would align 
behind the Pope, they speculated hopefully. But no such recognition 
was intended, and in the end the Pope’s blessings only further clarified 
the Confederacy as a nation bound to reactionary institutions against 
main currents of  reform and universal freedom.16
Once Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation toward the 
end of  1862, the Confederacy’s commitment to slavery became a far 
greater diplomatic hazard. Eugene Dumez, a Confederate emissary in 
Europe, cringed at the thought of  Confederates begging recognition 
from Popes and kings, to say nothing of  its scheme to ally with 
France’s puppet monarch in Mexico. But for slavery, he wrote in 
January 1864 to Henry Vignaud with the Confederate legation in 
Paris, Europe would treat the South as it did Poland, Hungary, and 
Italy, an aspiring republic deserving independence. Instead, he 
 lamented, the South was aligning with the very reactionary forces that 
had a long history of  suppressing such nationalist aspirations.17
Back in Dalton, Georgia, a young Confederate major general, 
Patrick Cleburne was composing a memo to his commanding officer 
suggesting a radical scheme he hoped would change world opinion of  
the South. Cleburne had left his native Ireland after service in the 
British army and came to Alabama. It took a foreigner, and one from 
an aspiring nation like Ireland, to understand that “some extraordi-
nary change” was now needed. Cleburne’s proposal to arm slaves to 
fight for the Confederacy in exchange for freedom stirred the most 
attention, then and now. But no less important was Cleburne’s inter-
national strategy. Ending slavery, he reasoned, “will compel the enemy 
to draw off  altogether or in the eyes of  the world to swallow the Dec-
laration of  Independence without the sauce and disguise of  philan-
thropy” and “strip the enemy of  foreign sympathy and assistance.” 
“The enemy has three sources of  supply: First, his own motley popu-
lation; secondly, our slaves; and thirdly, Europeans whose hearts are 
fired into a crusade against us by fictitious pictures of  the atrocities 
of  slavery, and who meet no hindrance from their Governments in such 
enterprise, because these Governments are equally antagonistic to the 
institution.”18
Cleburne’s ‘monstrous proposal,’ as one officer referred to it, was 
quickly censured, and all discussion of  it ceased within the ranks of  
the military. But the Confederate high command pursued a similar 
international policy one year later. Duncan F. Kenner, a wealthy Loui-
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siana slave owner, was sent in February 1865 to offer Britain and 
France emancipation in exchange for recognition. By this time, how-
ever, military events had destroyed all vestiges of  hope that the Con-
federacy would win independence. The Confederate struggle for 
 national independence was not lost on the battlefield alone; it failed 
to win recognition in a new world of  nations that embraced national 
independence and human freedom as one.
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